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RECENT DECISIONS
delay in arraignment, even with a person of low mentality, destroys
freedom of choice is, at best, a tenuous connection. Following the Court's
reasoning, five days, or three, or even one day of illegal delay in arraign-
ment might easily result in reversal of a conviction, and the drift away
from the real issue would become more perceptible. If the Court re-
verses a conviction when the universally recognized elements of coercion
are present, it is acting within its proper scope. But in doubtful cases,
like Fikes, when there appears to be no close tie-up between the volun-
tary character of the confession with the reprehensible police methods,
the Court should respect the opinion of an impartial trier of the facts.
The Court cannot hear the defendant on the witness stand, listen to the
police officers, or, if necessary, call psychiatrists; all the Court has before
it is the printed record.
THoMAs A. DUGAN
CORPORATION LAW - PROMOTORS' FIDUCIPARY DUTY -
CORPORATE RIGHT OF RECOVERY
Defendant and other promoters organized the plaintiff corporation for
the purpose of exploring and developing leased uranium daims. The
lease was obtained by them under an agreement to explore and develop
the claims and to pay royalties; no money consideration was paid. Once
the corporation was organized, the lease was assigned to it in return for
300,000 shares of stock, par value $3,000, and a promissory note for
$25,000. An additional 300,000 shares of stock were issued -o several
other promoters for "promotional services rendered." The remaining
stock (599,000 shares, one cent par value, at 50 cents per share) was
then issued to the public under an S.E.C. exemption.' The offering
circular published and distributed by the corporation disclosed the issu-
ance of the shares to the promoters and the execution of the note, without
fully disclosing the circumstances of the original acquisition of the lease
by the promoters. The proceeds from the sale of the stock were used to
discharge the promissory note held by one of the promoters. The cash
thus obtained was invested by the promoter in a home to which the
defendant took tide.
The corporation brought an action to establish an equitable lien on
the real property owned by defendant. Thus the court had to decide
whether the corporation could recover secret profits realized by its pro-
moters, a question which has plagued the courts of this country ever
since the diametrically opposing results were reached in the famous Old
117 C.F.R. §§ 230.220-230.224 (1949)) (S.E.C. Regulation A. General Exemp-
tions).
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Domnton litigatuons.2 The court of appeals3 reversed the judgment of
the district court, which had dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a daim upon which relief could be granted.4
Fundamentally, the existence of a corporate right of action has been
predicated upon whether or not the promoters had adequately disclosed
their gains to the corporation. Promoters have been held at liberty to
profit from their dealings with the corporation - and the profits may
be either modest or unreasonably large - so long as the corporation
was adequately informed.5 Since promoters have been classified as fi-
duciaries in their dealings with the corporation, it is their duty not to
refrain absolutely from making profits, but only to reveal all the facts to
the cestuz.6
Where promoters have realized profits from selling their own prop-
erty to the corporation at a price in excess of what they themselves had
paid, the form of the promotional scheme has governed the corporate
right of recovery.
1) No corporate right of action is allowed where the promoter
takes all the stock that was ever issued. The basis for such holding is that
all shareholders are fully informed, and they assent to the transaction.7
2) Where the promoter receives only part of the stock issued, and
the remainder is taken or subscribed to at the same time by parties who
were unaware of the profits, the presence of such uninformed interest
precludes the fictitious "corporate assent" which would later bar the
corporation from suing.8
3) Where the promoter obtains all the presently issued shares, but
the corporation retains additional shares, intended to 'be issued directly to
the public at a later date, the courts are in disagreement as to whether
the promoter's fiduciary duty extends to incoming subscribers so as to
'Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908);
Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 150, 89 N.E.
193 (1909), aff'd, 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
'San Juan Uranium Corporation v. Wolfe, 241 F.2d 121 (10th Cit. 1957)
'The litigation was controlled by Oklahoma law and was apparently a question of
first impression in that state. The Oklahoma Business Corporation Act of 1947,
OKLA. STAT. ANN., Title 18, Chapter A (1953) contains no specific provision
regulating the promoter in the organization of corporations.
13 AM. JUR., Corporatons § 116 (1938)
'McGowan, Legal Controls of Corporate Promoters' Profits, 25 GEo. L. J. 269
(1937)
'Hayes v. The Georgian Inc., 280 Mass. 10, 181 N.E. 765 (1932); In re Ambrose
Lake Tin and Copper Mining Company, 14 Ch. D. 390 (1880).
'Hughes v. Cadena de Cobre Mining Co., 13 Ariz. 52, 108 Pac. 231 (1910); Jarvis
v. Great Bend Oil Co., 66 Okla. 179, 168 Pac. 450 (1917)
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make the non-disclosure of profits to them a basis for corporate recovery 9
A slight majority follows the doctrine which the Massachusetts court
established in the Old Dommtn Cases and extends the promoter's fi-
duciary duty to the corporation, both as presently constituted and as it
would be after additional shares of stock were sold in the future. The
Supreme Court of the United States, on the same facts, refused so to
hold on the ground that the advent of additional shareholders did not
negative the "corporate assent" previously given by all the then share-
holders.
In the instant case, 'the majority of the court felt that deceptive
representations had been made by the promoters to prospective share-
holders to induce them to purchase the stock, the proceeds of which were
to be paid to the promoters in furtherance of a fictitious scheme. This
constituted a flagrant breach of the trust obligation imposed upon the
promoters to those whom they induced to invest in the corporation. The
technical assent of the corporation through its promoters was held to be
no defense to the action by the corporation when freed of the promoters'
influence, the court relying on the Massachusetts doctrine in rendering
its judgment.
The dissent would have affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint, predicating its -holding upon the federal doctrine. At the
time the lease was assigned to the corporation, no cause of action came
into being in the corporation; all of the then stockholders had full and
complete knowlodge of the facts and assented to the transaction. No
corporate right of recovery, said the dissent, arose thereafter by reason
of subsequent stockholders' purchasing stock in the corporation without
a full disclosure to them of the consideration paid for the lease. In addi-
non, the dissent expressed doubt as to whether any fraud had been perpe-
trated on the subsequent stockholders. The following information had
been published in the offering circular:
The Corporation has acquired by assignment a lease on the mining
properties. Consideration for this lease assignment is $25,000 in cash
and 300,000 shares of the Corporation's common stock. 300,00 shares
of the common stock have been issued , as part of the consideration for
the acqusition of the mining lease and option owned by the Corporation.
The Company intends to carry on a preliminary exploratory program
to establish the extent and possible value of uranium and vanadium ore
located on the above leased mining claims."
This disclosure, the dissent felt, sufficiently informed prospective in-
vestors of the wholly undeveloped and unproven nature of the mining
lease, and of its purely speculative value. But even if fraud had been
'See note 2 supra.
" San Juan Uranium Corporation v. Wolfe, 241 F.2d 121, 124, (10th Cir. 1957).
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proved," while it may have given rise to a personal cause of action, it
did not bring into existence a cause of action in the corporation which
had not theretofore existed.12
Were the acts or omissions of the promoters of such nature as to be
deemed fraudulent? A broad rule has been laid down that it is the duty
of the promoter not only to abstain from stating as a fact that which is
not so, -but not to fail to state any fact within his knowledge the existence
of which might in any form affect the extent or the quality of the ad-
vantages held out as an inducement.' 3  Statements may be found that a
promoter's duty is fulfilled where he discloses the fact that he is the real
vendor, and that he is not bound to make known the price at which he
purchased the property, so long as he does not actively or passively mis-
lead his associates.' 4 An examination of decisions cited in support of such
statements reveals that the owners of the property acquired it prior to
becoming promoters of a corporation, and before any promotional
scheme was conceived.' 5 It appears that the "fiduciary" status of the
promoters placed them under an affirmative duty to disclose the price
at which they had originally obtained the mining lease.
That "the exact legal status of the promoter has appeared a mis-
chievous puzzle to the jurists,"' 6 and still does, is well illustrated by the
instant case. The difficulty lies in finding a common-law pigeonhole
for a status which is a 'by-product of a legislative creature: the private
corporation.' 7  Various attempts to assign to the promoter a legal posi-
tion of agent, partner, fiduciary, trustee or outsider have led 'to em-
barrassment and confusion.' 8  Where the fiduciary concept has been
followed, the form of the promotional scheme may govern the corporate
right of recovery. Thus the promoters in the instant case could have
easily defeated a corporate recovery had they stuck to the approved rule
of taking all the authorized shares of stock themselves, and selling it to
innocent purchasers at a latter date. The application of this doctrine is
I On July 19, 1955, the S.E.C. issued an order temporarily suspending the corpora-
nons exemption, 20 FED. REG. 5295 (1955); the order was based in part upon
.untrue statements of material facts" in the offering circular, and that the offering
operated "as a fraud or deceit upon the purchasers."
'The defrauded shareholders could also bring an action as a spurious class suit
under Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
' 13 AM. JuP., Corporations § 117 (1938).
UIbui., citing 8 B.R.C. 907 (1919)
'Burbank v. Dennis, 101 Cal. 90, 35 Pac. 444 (1894); Spaulding v. North Mil-
waukee Town Site Co., 106 Wis. 481, 81 N.W 1064 (1900); See Exeter v. Sawyer,
146 Mo. 302, 47 S.W 951 (1898)
161 DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONs 425 (4th rev. ed. 1941).
17 Isaacs, The Promoter: A Legislative Problem, 38 HARV. L. R. 887 (1925).
" Id. at 898.
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well illustrated by the decision of the Massachusetts court in Hays v. The
Georgwn Inm.,19 which doctrine has always represented the law in this
country.
The Federal Securities Acts20 do not make any direct provisions con-
cerning the liability of promoters to a corporation. The Securities Act
of 1933 empowers the S.E.C. to issue a stop order suspending the ef-
fectiveness of a registration statement which
includes untrue statements of a material fact or omits to state any
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make state-
ments therein not misleading. 2
Such enables the Commission to control promoters' profits by forcing
disclosure within reasonable limits. The benefits of the federal enact-
ments do not oftentimes mure to the small, uniformed investor to whom
SE.C-exempt "penny stock" is made palpable. It is this casual investor
whom certain investment circles are trying to reach of late, and who
appears to be most in need of protection.
Though comment, criticism and advice has not been lacking in the
past,2 2 it still remains for an enlightened legislature to give the promoter
a legal status commensurate with his importance in today's world of
-business corporations.
B. ALEANDER RISTAU
'280 Mass. 10, 181 N.E. 765 (1932).
-'Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §S 77a-77aa
(1947); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj
(1947).
2148 STAT. 79, 80 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1947).
2 Notes 6, 16, 17 supra.
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